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LEGISLATURES AND LEGAL CHANGE: THE 
REFORM OF DIVORCE LAW 
Carl E. Schneider* 
A SILENT REVOLUTION: ROUTINE POLICY MAKING AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES. By 
Herbert Jacob. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1988. Pp. 184. 
$19.95. 
It is now widely understood that in the last two decades American 
family law has been transformed. What is not widely understood is 
how that transformation occurred. It is a transformation of remark-
able scope, a scope yet more striking for having been made not in one 
national decision, but in fifty state legislatures. And the obvious expla-
nations do not fully account for the transformation. True, social atti-
tudes and social behavior have shifted dramatically; but to say that is 
not to explain why the law changed. No bureaucracy made divorce 
reform its business. No interest group on the model of the civil rights 
or ecology movements demanded changes. Indeed, far from being po-
litically controverted, much of the transformation went almost unno-
ticed. In A Silent Revolution, a political scientist, Professor Herbert 
Jacob, contributes notably to our understanding of this puzzling trans-
formation. The purpose of this review is to make the fact, the sub-
stance, and the quality of that contribution better known among 
lawyers and legal academics. 
Professor Jacob's book examines perhaps the central aspect of the 
transformation of American family law - the reworking in the last 
two decades of the law surrounding divorce. Until the mid-1960s, 
America thought of itself as having "fault-based" divorce. Divorce 
was an adversary proceeding in which one spouse alleged that the 
other had violated a basic obligation of marriage in some serious way, 
usually by committing adultery, by deserting his or her family, or by 
treating his or her spouse cruelly. By the mid-1970s, however, 
America could think of itself as having "no-fault" divorce. To obtain 
a divorce a spouse had only to allege, in some form, that the marriage 
had broken down. This triumph of no-fault divorce alone was impres-
sive, and it was made more so by accompanying revisions of the prin-
ciples of the law governing alimony, the division of marital property, 
and child custody. 
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Reforms of such magnitude are likely to rest on large-scale social 
changes, and, as Professor Jacob notes, twentieth-century America has 
been prolific of changes in family life. Longer life-spans and smaller 
families have meant that couples generally live together longer, and 
particularly live together longer after their children have left them. 
Women have increasingly entered the workforce, not just before they 
have children and after their children have left home, but while their 
children are young. Further, women have increasingly found better-
paying jobs. These economic changes, Professor Jacob suggests, have 
both worsened tensions within marriages and made it easier - eco-
nomically, socially, and psychologically - for women to leave them. 
The revival of feminism in the early 1960s heightened these effects. 
And social and personal expectations of marriage - that it be in-
tensely rewarding, that it be a partnership of equals - grew at the 
same time that divorce came to seem less wrong and even less harmful 
personally and socially. These movements in social attitudes and 
structure were reflected in changing views about divorce laws: in 
1966, only thirteen percent of the population believed divorce laws 
were too strict; in 1974, after no-fault divorce had become widely 
available, one-third of the population thought so. 
Changing social facts, and even changing opinions about law, do 
not by themselves change law. What transformed new attitudes to-
ward divorce into new law? Professor Jacob begins that story in New 
Yark. New York notoriously had the most restrictive divorce law in 
the country; adultery was the only ground for divorce. And New 
Yark notoriously had the most flouted divorce law in the country; the 
same kind of fraudulent adultery that was long the stuff of English 
novels and life was regularly confected in New York. The delicate-
minded (and well-to-do) New Yorker went to Reno, for Nevada had a 
short residency requirement and a liberal divorce statute. The gap be-
tween the law on the books and the law in action distressed many who 
knew about it and particularly distressed the lawyers and judges who 
collaborated in or countenanced the hypocrisy and perjury which 
made the system work. 
The catalyst of divorce reform in New York was a public relations 
man and law student who was a Democratic member of the New York 
legislature. Quite by chance, he came upon the issue and, in the hope 
of attracting attention and promoting his career, embraced it. He 
found that divorce reform won him little attention. But he did find an 
ally in an admiralty lawyer who was chairman of a special committee 
on family law of the elite Bar Association of the City of New York, 
which was concerned about the fraud that suffused New York divorce 
law. The legislator and the lawyer went to Professor Henry Foster, of 
the New York University Law School, an expert in family law. Pro-
fessor Foster drafted both a bill and a legislative committee's report on 
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the bill, a report which emphasized the problem of fraud and of public 
confidence in the law. 
In the legislature, the bill attracted bipartisan support and little 
opposition, even from the Catholic Church. The Church's power had 
long been feared by proponents of divorce reform in New York, but its 
political strength had recently been eroded and its efforts were di-
rected to battles over abortion and parochial school aid. Legislators 
who disliked the bill because it made divorce easier were accorded an 
amendment providing for compulsory conciliation proceedings. The 
press ignored the issue. Thus, even though the Bar Association of the 
City of New York was the only interest group actively backing the bill, 
it became law in 1966. The statute was justified as improving the hon-
esty of divorce proceedings, not as introducing no-fault divorce. But 
when, a few years later, the waiting period for divorce after separation 
was reduced to one year, it was widely said that no-fault divorce had 
come to New York. 
While New York had had perhaps the most conservative divorce 
law in the country, California had, at least in practice, one of the most 
liberal. Nevertheless, California's was a fault-based statute. In the 
early 1960s, a group of elite matrimonial lawyers from the San Fran-
cisco Bay area who felt that the law invited dishonesty and exacer-
bated the hostility between divorcing spouses began to work toward 
reform. They were joined by a similar group from Los Angeles. They 
testified before a legislative committee to advocate reforms, including 
no-fault divorce. In 1966, Governor Edmund Brown appointed a 
Commission on the Family which included members of both the San 
Francisco and Los Angeles groups. Arguing that no-fault divorce was 
already effectively available, the Commission (in the most conservative 
of terms and tones) advocated eliminating fault grounds altogether 
and altering a number of other aspects of California's divorce law. In 
1967, these proposals were in their essentials introduced into the legis-
lature by a conservative Republican. As in New York, the bill was 
presented as primarily a technical and limited reform of the law, and it 
attracted little notice and little opposition. The bill passed and was 
signed into law by Governor Ronald Reagan. 
The next stage of the transformation of divorce law involved the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The 
NCCUSL was founded in 1892 as a quasi-public group of law profes-
sors, elite lawyers, and legislators funded by appropriations from the 
states and by grants from private sources. It was intended to promote 
uniform state laws by proposing (in conjunction with the American 
Bar Association) drafts of laws in areas in which uniformity among 
the states might be desirable. The NCCUSL had been interested in 
divorce law since its inception, and by the mid-1960s a group of elite 
divorce lawyers and law professors had convinced the Conference that 
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the widespread dishonesty in divorce proceedings, the unduly adver-
sarial nature of divorce proceedings, and the great diversity of divorce 
standards among the states justified another try at formulating a uni-
form statute. Once again, in other words, the problem was formulated 
by lawyers in relatively technical lawyer's terms. 
Elite law-reform organizations like the NCCUSL and the Ameri-
can Law Institute usually work through a committee staffed by a "re-
porter" who is commonly a law professor expert in the relevant field. 
In this case, the co-reporters were Professor Robert Levy, who was 
and is a family law specialist at the University of Minnesota Law 
School, and Professor Herma Hill Kay, who taught and teaches family 
law at Boalt Hall and who had been prominent in the reform of Cali-
fornia divorce law. The reporters drafted, and the committee and the 
Conference adopted, the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. The 
UMDA not only offered states a model no-fault divorce statute, it pro-
posed an entire body of family law, one including reforms of the law of 
marital property, alimony, and child custody. Yet despite the 
UMDA's sweep, debate over it was primarily technical and ignored 
the many difficult social issues the UMDA implicated. Approval by 
the ABA's House of Delegates, while inhibited by institutional and 
personal conflicts, came in 1973, reasonably easily and without discus-
sion of any underlying social issues. 
It is hard to say how much influence the UMDA had and how 
much its advocacy of no-fault divorce simply reflected the temper of 
the times. The endorsement of no-fault divorce by such respectable 
and conservative institutions as the NCCUSL and the ABA at least 
promoted a trend toward reform that had already gathered considera-
ble momentum: By 1974, forty-five states had what could be described 
as no-fault divorce. By 1985, every state had no-fault divorce grounds, 
although many states also retained fault grounds. This description of 
reform's extent is somewhat misleading, however, since "no-fault" is 
an ambiguous term. Pure no-fault statutes permit divorce if the mar-
riage has irretrievably broken down, but statutes allowing divorce af-
ter separation for a defined period are also often considered no-fault 
statutes. By the latter standard, a number of states had had no-fault 
divorce well before the 1960s. Even in those states, however, the 
1960s and 1970s brought an increased receptivity to rapid divorce on 
demand. 
The UMDA also contributed to the reform of the other significant 
components of divorce law: the law of marital property, alimony, and 
child support. Except in a few community property states, property 
had traditionally been allocated to the spouse who owned it at the time 
of the divorce, an allocation heavily influenced by the name in which 
the property was held. In the 1970s, this rule was increasingly aban-
doned in favor of systems that were more inclined to treat property as 
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marital rather than as the property of individuals, that explicitly rec-
ognized in economic terms nonfinancial contributions to a family's 
well-being, that ignored marital fault in allocating property, and that 
gave judges discretion to divide property "equitably." Alimony had, 
in principle, traditionally been available to wives innocent of marital 
fault until they remarried. This rule was increasingly abandoned in 
favor of rehabilitative alimony - alimony designed only to help a 
spouse (whether maritally at fault or not) regain the ability to support 
himself or herself. Finally, custody of children had traditionally gone 
to the mother. In the 1970s and 1980s, this maternal presumption 
weakened and various forms of joint custody grew more appealing. _ 
How, then, does Professor Jacob explain the transformation of di-
vorce law? First, it is worth noting several forces that played a smaller 
part than might be expected. The Roman Catholic Church, whose 
opposition to divorce was well-established and well-known, had little 
effect on the legislative debates of most states. Feminism had a some-
what greater impact, but the feminist position on these issues was un-
developed, and there were feminists on both sides. Further, the 
women's movement was absorbed in other issues, like the Equal 
Rights Amendment. Indeed, no interest group, to say nothing of any 
mass movement, was deeply committed to reforming divorce law. Bar 
associations were involved in every state's reform effort, but not inten-
sively: divorce law is a relatively low-status practice, and not all di-
vorce lawyers favored no-fault divorce. Even the press widely ignored 
the reform. And because of the low visibility of divorce reform, it was 
not an issue which legislators could use to advance their careers. 
So let us repeat the question. How does Professor Jacob believe 
the transformation was worked? Changes in social structure and so-
cial attitudes made the transformation certainly less controversial and 
perhaps plainly desirable. Reform cost the fisc nothing and gained in 
respectability and even in appeal as more and more states adopted it. 
Reform cost almost nothing politically too, since the absence of pub-
licity about it helped ensure the absence of opposition to it. All these 
factors allowed a minute number of reformers, often lawyers with pro-
fessional interests in divorce law, to work with a small number oflegis-
lators to achieve their goals. They succeeded because they did nothing 
to alter the conditions I have just described: they carefully defined 
their proposals as conservative, incremental, and technical changes in 
the law; they denied they were dealing with any significant social 
problems; they strove not to stir up interest-group opposition and 
worked assiduously to propitiate the likeliest powerful opponent, the 
Catholic Church; and they asserted their special expertise against the 
claims of laymen. 
In sum, Professor Jacob argues, the transformation of American 
divorce law exemplifies "routine policymaking." Professor Jacob 
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notes that we ordinarily think of policy as created in a fierce conflict 
between deeply motivated interest groups. But legislatures could not 
accomplish all they need to if all policy were made that way. In fact, 
much policy is made quite routinely-reforms are drawn narrowly 
and described as conservative, experts are prominently relied on, the 
costs of reforms are kept low, and public attention is avoided. 
But even if divorce reform was achieved through routine poli-
cymaking, its effects were not trivial: no-fault divorce was universal-
ized, the common law principles for dividing property on divorce were 
widely abandoned, alimony became rarer and shorter, and joint cus-
tody of the children of divorced parents made maternal custody less 
automatic. A Silent Revolution thus closes by evaluating these re-
forms. Professor Jacob observes that assessments of divorce reform 
depend on who you ask and what they thought the reforms were 
meant to do. The kind of lawyers who advocated no-fault divorce 
have not systematically evaluated divorce reform, but their general im-
pression is that no-fault has reduced fraud and acrimony in divorce 
proceedings. The most extensive and best publicized consideration of 
the new laws by a social scientist has been Lenore Weitzman's The 
Divorce Revolution (1985). Professor Weitzman argued that reform 
has generally disserved women by reducing the sense that marriage is 
for life, by depriving wives of the bargaining chip that fault-based di-
vorce often provided, and by eliminating the advantages that the inno-
cent wife had under no-fault divorce. Professor Weitzman also 
reported that rehabilitative alimony terminates sooner than traditional 
alimony and that it often fails of its rehabilitative purpose. Finally, 
she noted that the weakening of the presumption that mothers get cus-
tody gave fathers a bargaining chip they had not had before. Professor 
Weitzman's figures suggested that, one year after a divorce, men's 
standard of living had risen forty-two percent, while women's had 
fallen seventy-three percent. Professor Jacob is skeptical of Professor 
Weitzman's conclusions. He observes that her data are from Califor-
nia, whose laws are less favorable to women than those of many other 
states, and that other studies reach different results. He sketches na-
tional data he has examined which indicate that any difference that 
no-fault divorce has made is slight and is in women's favor. 
I hope that this all-too-abbreviated survey of Professor Jacob's 
book has convinced you that it warrants reading. The book is not, of 
course, without faults. But its faults are largely amiable ones, often 
the product of its admirable ambition. Professor Jacob has, after all, 
not only undertaken to investigate three major reforms - those of no-
fault divorce, of marital property and alimony, and of child custody -
each with a different legislative career, but also to develop an analysis 
of "routine policymaking." The book's scope deters some of its parts 
from being as fully developed as the reader might wish. For instance, 
Professor Jacob describes the legislative adoption of no-fault divorce 
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with uncommon efficiency (such stories are usually related in such stu-
pefying detail that their structure is wholly obscured). But he does not 
attempt an equally enlightening account of how marital-property and 
child-custody law were rewritten. 
Professor Jacob's exploration of whether the changes he describes 
can aptly be called a "revolution" is also somewhat limited. This 
question is important because it speaks to his suggestion that revolu-
tionary change can be achieved through routine policymaking. As he 
notes, many features of the reform were part of the law of some juris-
dictions well before the 1960s. Some of the "revolution" in divorce 
grounds, for example, was accomplished by simply relabelling as "no-
fault" statutes which permitted divorce where couples had been living 
apart. This prefiguring of reforms is, after all, what made it possible to 
describe them as merely incremental. Furthermore, a great deal of old 
doctrine still persists - some states did not abolish fault grounds 
when they adopted no-fault grounds, and many states have not drasti-
cally revised their law of marital property and child custody. Even 
where doctrine has clearly changed, judicial behavior may not have. 
Judicial resistance is always a _possible impediment to reform, particu-
larly where, as in family law, judges are accorded wide discretion. 
Most of the reform statutes are notably undirective. For example, the 
UMDA's marital property and child custody provisions offer judges 
only a long list of criteria, without explaining a criterion's intended 
effect or weight. With statutes so vague, and with the circumstances 
of families varying so much, appellate courts cannot readily supervise 
trial courts or develop systematic standards which might guide them. 
Further, most families do not have enough property for courts to di-
vide and do not dispute who is to have custody of the children. And 
most of the post-divorce relations between parties are negotiated, not 
set by courts, although legal rules presumably affect negotiations. In 
sum, we are left wondering how effective the revolution Professor Ja-
cob describes can be and thus what the scope of routine policymaking 
is. 
My own sense is that the changes in family law have been greater 
than these considerations would suggest. The revolution is, I think, 
sparked and sustained by a set of ideological assumptions which are 
widely shared among many elite segments of society, assumptions hav-
ing to do with egalitarianism and with psychologically derived views 
of human nature. Professor Jacob tends to neglect such factors. 
While he is sensitive to the broad social changes that underlay the 
legislative reforms, he only hints at the process by which particular 
groups of people perceived those social changes, conceptualized them, 
brought them into social discourse, and proposed legislative responses 
to them. For instance, we are told that experts in family law were 
central in the reform process, but we are not told about the law review 
literature that preceded the reforms. I suspect that had Professor Ja-
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cob pursued these questions further, both his explanation of the re-
forms and his description of their scope would have been more fully 
textured and convincing. 
The reader is also left tantalized by the chapter which evaluates the 
various reforms. Professor Jacob, of course, is hampered by the fact 
that the reforms are so recent. This has meant, for example, that stud-
ies of joint custody are largely meaningless, since parents pioneering 
joint custody have tended to be self-selected enthusiasts, since the so-
cial scientists studying them have tended to be partisan, and since it is 
too early to measure the long-term effects on children. Similarly, stud-
ies of the financial consequences of divorce reform have generally been 
of single jurisdictions, and it is too early to tell yet, for example, which 
effects are the effects of no-fault divorce and which are the effects of 
changes in marital property law. Professor Jacob does give us a 
glimpse of his own intriguing study, which uses national data, but it is 
only a glimpse. 
Finally, the reader is left hungry for a more extensive discussion of 
Professor Jacob's intriguing ideas about routine policymaking. Per-
haps because the case-study format is limiting, many questions are not 
fully addressed: What are other examples of routine policymaking? 
When is it likely to occur? What are its strengths? What are its lim-
its? I particularly wonder whether "routine policymaking" is not a 
somewhat inaccurate label and one that covers too many different 
ways of making policy. Consider the example of divorce reform. The 
move to no-fault divorce can in some ways be called routine. The is-
sue of how easy divorce should be had long and widely been contro-
verted. By mid-century, those in favor of easier divorce clearly 
predominated, if only because it had become plain that the enforce-
ment problems of strict divorce were unmanageable. The divorce rate 
rose inexorably despite all attempts to stem it. States like Nevada un-
dercut the restrictive statutes of states like New York. Perjury became 
common in states like New York. Courts acceded to pressure for eas-
ier divorce by manipulating divorce grounds like mental cruelty. By 
the time of the social and ideological changes of the 1960s, the way 
had been well prepared for no-fault divorce, and its adoption can rea-
sonably be called the routine political implementation of a social deci-
sion. On the other hand, no such preparation paved the way for 
changes in marital property and child custody law. Neither aspect of 
the law had been debated on any broad scale since the nineteenth cen-
tury. Thus legislatures seem to have had a more active role in actually 
developing policy, and the changes they made seem correspondingly 
more vulnerable. Professor Jacob apparently denominates the latter 
role "routine" because it did not involve conflict. But if "routine" 
policymaking is simply any nonconfiictual policymaking, the category 
is so broad that it needs further development. 
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To criticize a book for not doing more of what it already does well 
is surely to praise with faint damns. And praise is the note on which I 
wish to close. Professor Jacob has provided us with a fair-minded, and 
illuminating book which much needed to be written. Students of fam-
ily law will find it a valuable history of the recent transformation of 
their subject. They will also find it an admirable corrective to the two 
heroic views of how legal change can and should occur. The first such 
view is that legislative change happens only at the behest of aroused 
interest groups. The second is that legislative change happens only at 
the behest of aroused courts. Professor Jacob shows us that a third, if 
less heroic, view is possible and demands our attention. 
